The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of China continues to strengthen year after year, growing even faster than the most optimistic expert forecasts. Speaking before the French National Assembly on October 13, 2021, Admiral Pierre Vandier, then Chief of Staff of the French Navy, recalled that his predecessor estimated in 2016 that China was launching the equivalent of the entire French fleet every four years. 'Now it is every three years,' Vandier noted. This spectacular growth, initiated at the beginning of the 21st century, is now reflected in a striking figure: the Chinese Navy fields approximately 370 warships, surpassing the US Navy, which has around 295 hulls.
While Beijing's ambitions for its surface fleet were already well known, recent developments show that its appetite now extends across multiple domains. In just six months, China launched five nuclear attack submarines, a record for the country. President Xi Jinping believes that his 'Chinese Dream' requires the development of a major maritime power. To find a comparable production rate, one must look back to the Soviet Union, which built 235 nuclear submarines until 1991, roughly six per year. This industrial tempo is one of Beijing's key strategic advantages, and it is all the more spectacular given that American shipyards are currently experiencing a slowdown.
After acknowledging their inability to deliver the submarines promised to Australia under the AUKUS pact, the United States now admits that its production has fallen to about 1.2 nuclear submarines per year. According to a 2024 Pentagon report, modernizing the submarine force is a priority for the PLAN. The document emphasizes that this component continues to grow in strength, integrating new technologies, especially submarine-launched cruise missiles, while developing industrial construction capabilities. This strategy pursues three goals: strengthening nuclear deterrence at sea with ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), developing offensive underwater warfare capabilities with nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), and increasing the overall size of the fleet.
Little Operational Experience
Beyond these capacity objectives, the development of the submarine fleet also responds to a logic of 'anti-access/area denial' (A2/AD). According to the US institution, submarines are one of the main tools intended to prevent or complicate the intervention of American forces in a potential conflict over Taiwan, particularly against carrier strike groups. A note from the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) complements this analysis by stressing that these submarines are part of a broader system combining missiles, aviation, and surface fleet to make any American intervention particularly costly.
Yet the PLAN's progress is not limited to the depths. Beijing also aims to assert itself on the surface with ships capable of projecting power ever farther from its coasts, including a genuine fleet of frigates and aircraft carriers. The Shandong symbolizes this new industrial power as the first carrier built in China, while the Fujian, commissioned last November, marks a further step. Equipped with electromagnetic catapults, it enhances the strike, early warning, electronic warfare, and anti-submarine warfare capabilities of future Chinese carrier strike groups. 'The Fujian represents a technological breakthrough as it finally approaches American and French standards in terms of aircraft launch,' explains a French officer.
'China is gradually developing its ability to conduct operations beyond the first island chain,' he continues, as the Chinese Navy is no longer limited to defending its coastal waters. Its rise also depends on its capacity to detect, track, and target enemy forces, and to coordinate all these means—skills that have not yet been tested in a high-intensity conflict. 'China now has the largest navy in the world in terms of hull numbers, but it has not yet demonstrated the same level of operational mastery as the United States or France for complex, prolonged, and distant operations,' nuances a French officer.
The Foundation for Strategic Research also notes that recent deployments of Chinese aircraft carriers show an increase in the complexity of operations that Xi Jinping's sailors can manage. In 2024, the PLAN conducted its first operations with two carrier strike groups. In June 2025, the tracks of the Liaoning and Shandong may have corresponded to a simulation of intercepting an enemy carrier group. However, the document by Jérôme Henry, a former frigate commander, highlights a fundamental limitation: the PLAN has not faced an enemy naval force since the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974.
This lack of combat experience makes it difficult to assess its behavior under fire, in the face of losses, jammed communications, or unforeseen situations. 'Despite its progress, the Chinese have not yet demonstrated the nature or scale of the long-range logistics and complex operations capabilities that would be necessary for a major overseas operation. In fact, there are also shortcomings in the competence of some commanders and in decentralized command,' estimates a senior officer.
While waiting for major battles far from its waters, anti-piracy missions have given the Chinese real logistical experience. Regionally, the PLAN has multiplied deployments in the Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific, and the Gulf of Aden. Since 2008, anti-piracy missions in that region have served as a full-scale laboratory for the Chinese Navy. Deployed for months thousands of kilometers from its home ports, it has learned to resupply its ships, coordinate its forces, and conduct operations far from national territory. This experience has translated into concrete capabilities: in 2015, it independently evacuated nearly 600 Chinese nationals and more than 200 foreigners from Yemen, and then cemented its presence with the opening in 2017 of its first overseas military base in Djibouti.
Pending a potential large-scale operation around Taiwan or elsewhere, Xi Jinping's navy is multiplying exercises. China and Russia have been conducting joint naval maneuvers for several years, now observed with growing attention by Western countries in the context of the war in Ukraine. From July 6 to 13, Beijing and Moscow conducted a new joint exercise aimed at strengthening their 'strategic partnership'. 'Following this exercise, part of the forces of the two countries will take part in a joint maritime patrol in a sector of the Pacific,' said the Chinese Defense Ministry, which claims to want to 'jointly respond to security challenges and preserve peace and stability in the region.' This presence is far from discreet: on Tuesday, Japan stated that China had conducted live-fire exercises in its waters for the first time during a drill with Russia.
The rapid expansion of China's navy is also visible in its surface combatants. The Type 055 destroyers, often compared to cruisers, are among the most capable warships afloat, equipped with 112 vertical launch cells. The PLAN also fields a large number of Type 054A frigates and is introducing new Type 052DL destroyers. The submarine fleet includes both nuclear and advanced conventional types like the Yuan-class (Type 039A), which uses air-independent propulsion. China has also developed anti-ship ballistic missiles like the DF-21D and DF-26, which are integrated into its naval strategy to threaten enemy carriers.
However, experts caution that numbers alone do not tell the whole story. The US Navy still has a significant advantage in overall tonnage, aircraft carrier capabilities, and global reach. The PLAN's logistics support, underway replenishment, and maintenance infrastructure are still maturing. Moreover, the Chinese Navy has not conducted sustained power projection operations far from its shores, unlike the US Navy which has decades of experience in distant conflicts. The PLAN's ability to operate multiple carrier strike groups in a coordinated manner remains unproven.
In terms of technology, China has made remarkable strides. The electromagnetic catapults on the Fujian are a state-of-the-art feature only previously achieved by the US Navy. The new nuclear submarines are quieter and more capable than their predecessors. Yet, the quality of construction, reliability, and crew training are areas where China may still lag behind. The industrial base, while fast, may also face bottlenecks in producing complex subsystems and advanced electronics.
Strategically, China's naval buildup is part of a broader effort to secure its maritime interests, protect sea lanes of communication, and challenge US dominance in the Indo-Pacific. The Belt and Road Initiative has a maritime component, and bases like Djibouti support this ambition. However, China's aggressive posture in the South China Sea and tensions over Taiwan have alarmed neighbors and the US. The PLAN's growing capability increases the risks of miscalculation and conflict.
The future of the PLAN depends on continued investment, technological innovation, and the ability to convert industrial output into operational effectiveness. The lack of recent combat experience is a critical unknown. Should China engage in a real conflict, its navy would face its first true test since 1974. Until then, the PLAN remains a formidable force on paper, but one with significant question marks about its actual combat readiness.
Source:Lejdd News